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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Spencer Cox appeals, contending the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress the evidence found in his car. Specifically, he asserts that the officers facilitated
Geno’s warrantless entry into, and sniff of, the interior of his car by leaving his car door open
after they had nonverbally asked it be opened. As such, he contends the dog sniff in this case
amounted to an impermissible warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment.
He also asserts that the district court erred by not addressing his argument that the Idaho
Constitution should provide greater protections in this context because of the goals that Idaho’s
exclusionary rule promotes. For example, greater protections would promote the goal of judicial
integrity because the analysis used on under the federal constitution is contrary to several
fundamental points, including that it is based on an analysis of the officer’s subjective intentions.
Under either constitution, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Cox’s motion
to suppress the evidence found as a result of that improper sniff and remand this case for further
proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On the night in question, Officer Green was checking license plates of cars in a hotel
parking lot when he saw a Cadillac pull in and the driver did not immediately get out of the car.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.1-4.)1 Officer Green continued with his patrols, returning to the parking lot every

1

While the transcripts in this case are provided in two independently bound and paginated
volumes, all citations to “Tr.” in this brief refer to the volume containing the transcripts of the
motion to suppress hearing held on May 2, 2018, and the change of plea hearing held on May 21,
2018.
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hour or so. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-11.) Each time he returned, he made note of the Cadillac, which had
moved parking spots during each intervening period. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-11.) The third time he saw
the Cadillac, Officer Green noted it was not fully in its parking space and was still running.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.8-15.) Officer Green watched the Cadillac for approximately fifteen minutes
before “my curiosity got the better of me.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.9-14.) He testified this was a hightraffic area for narcotics, and that the hotel did not want people sleeping in their parking lot.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4, p.14, Ls.1-13.) As such, he approached the car to investigate potential
disorderly conduct charges for loitering. (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-13, p.13, Ls.11-19, p.31, Ls.4-10.)
Other officers arrived around the same time per Officer Green’s request for backup. (Tr., p.12,
L.23 - p.13, L.1, p.35, L.24 - p.36, L.2.)
Officer Green, who was wearing the traditional police uniform, was able to see a person,
later identified as Mr. Cox, sleeping in the front seat of the Cadillac. (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-14, p.17,
Ls.7-17; Exhibit 1 (the video from Officer Green’s body camera).) He could also see a knife
between Mr. Cox’s legs and a bat sitting hear his hand. (Tr., p.14, Ls.18-23.) Officer Green
knocked on the car’s window. (Tr., p.15, Ls.8-9.) Mr. Cox initially started to wake slowly, but
quickly became alert. (Tr., p.15, Ls.8-11.) Though Officer Green testified he recalled verbally
asking Mr. Cox to open the car door (Tr., p.18, Ls.11-12), the district court found, after
reviewing the body camera videos, that the officer misremembered that point. (R., p.70 n.2;
see generally Exhibit 1.) The district court also found that Mr. Cox physically opened the door.
(R., p.70 n.2.)
As Mr. Cox opened the door, Officer Green stepped into the negative space between the
open door and the body of the car. (See Exhibit 1, ~1:25.) Mr. Cox was talking fast, and kept
moving his hands around despite the officer’s instructions to keep his hands on the steering
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wheel. (Tr., p.15, Ls.11-14, p.16, Ls.13-15.) Officer Green testified, at that point, he suspected
Mr. Cox was under the influence of a stimulant. (Tr., p.15, Ls.18-24.)
Because Officer Green did not have a good angle from which to secure the bat, he asked
Mr. Cox to get out of the car. (Tr., p.19, L.24 - p.20, L.2.) He kept his hand on Mr. Cox’s arm
in order to control Mr. Cox’s movement as he got out of the car. (Tr., p.28, Ls.3-5.) Officer
Green performed a pat search of Mr. Cox, then released Mr. Cox’s arm. (Tr., p.28, Ls.6-8.)
However, because Mr. Cox refused to consent to additional searches of his pockets, Officer
Green told Mr. Cox to keep his hands on his head, and Mr. Cox complied. (Tr., p.20, Ls.5-13.)
Officer Green escorted Mr. Cox, with his hands on his head, over to his police vehicle in order to
gather information from him. (Tr., p.20, Ls.13-16; Exhibit 1, ~4:33.) Mr. Cox did not try to shut
his car’s door or ask the officer to shut it. (Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.21, L.4.) Instead, he asked why he
was being detained and to talk to a lawyer. (Tr., p.30, Ls.5-8; Exhibit 1, ~4:33.)
As Officer Green led Mr. Cox away from the car, Officer Marshall Plaisted got his drug
dog, Geno, out of his car. (Tr., p.40, Ls.4-8.) Mr. Cox’s car was still running and the heater fans
were blowing as Officer Plaisted brought Geno toward the car. (Tr., p.40, Ls.15-25.) Officer
Plaisted admitted there are no official policies or procedures regarding whether to shut an open
car door before conducting a dog sniff. (Tr., p.41, Ls.18-21.) However, he explained his own
practice is to “play it as it lies,” by which he meant, if the officers opened the door, then he
closes it again, but if the occupant of the car opened the door, then he leaves it open, unless the
occupant requests it be closed. (Tr., p.41, L.22 - p.42, L.3, p.42, Ls.24-25.) Officer Plaisted
admitted it does not matter to him, as the dog handler, whether or not the doors are open or
closed. (Tr., p.42, Ls.4-11; see also Tr., p.25, Ls.2-22 (Officer Green testifying that whether the
door is open or closed should not affect the dog’s ability to detect an odor, if one is present).) In
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this case, Officer Plaisted decided to leave the door open while Geno sniffed the car.
(See Exhibit 2, ~5:40.)
Officer Plaisted testified that Geno’s behavior started to change as he started “rounding
the car door. (Tr., p.47, Ls.7-8; see Exhibit 2, ~5:45 (showing the officer approaching the open
door from the front of the car).) Geno then went into the negative space between the open door
and the body of the car, sniffed at the pockets on the inside of the door, and sat down. (Tr., p.47,
Ls.16-18.) Officer Plaisted tried to get Geno to leave that area and move further along the car,
but Geno turned back and sniffed at the floorboards inside the body of the car. (Exhibit 2, ~6:08;
R., p.71 (the district court finding that Officer Plaisted will try to direct Geno away from a
particular position in order to verify whether he is actually alerting).) The prosecutor argued, “if
anything, its nose may have pierced the threshold a little bit, but comes around, its feet appear to
be on the ground, the pavement.” (Tr., p.57, Ls.6-9.) Geno verified the alert by sitting again
after sniffing the floorboards. (Tr., p.52, Ls.2-9 (Officer Plaisted describing this as two alerts);
compare R., p.73 (the district court finding “Geno persisted in his alert”).)
The officers searched the pocket on the inside of the driver’s door and found a bag
containing a crystal substance which presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine, and
Mr. Cox was charged with possession of a controlled substance.2 (R., pp.25-26, 72.) Mr. Cox
moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, asserting the evidence had been seized in
violation of both the federal and state constitutions. (R., p.38.) He argued that, by not shutting
the door, the officers had facilitated Geno’s sniff of the interior of his car, which meant the sniff

2

Mr. Cox was also charged with resisting the officers for trying to run when they formally
placed him under arrest. (R., p.26.) That charge was ultimately dismissed pursuant to the
subsequent plea agreement. (See Tr., p.66, L.12.)
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was an unreasonable, warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. (R., p.41; Tr., p.59,
L.25 - p.26, L.5.) Trial counsel also specifically argued that the evidence should be suppressed
under the Idaho Constitution because “Article I, Section 17 in the Idaho Constitution has
stronger safeguards against this type of intrusion. The exclusionary rule exi[s]ted long before
Mapp v. Ohio. And, additionally, State v. Thompson from 1988 noted the uniqueness of our state
in which citizens more jealously guard privacy rights.” (Tr., p.62, Ls.11-17 (referencing Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746 (1988)).)
The district court did not address the state constitutional issue in its order on the motion
to suppress. (See generally R., pp.69-76.) It did, however, conclude there was no violation
under the Fourth Amendment because it determined Geno only acted instinctively in following
the odor and, “at no point did Geno actually get into the vehicle.”

(R., pp.72-73.)

It

acknowledged Mr. Cox’s assertion that Officer Green had effectively prevented him from
closing the door himself, and noted that Idaho has not addressed the situation where, as here, the
occupant does not actually have an opportunity to close the door himself. (R., pp.74, 75.)
However, it concluded he still could have tried to close it with his foot or asked that it be closed.
(R., p.75.) As such, it concluded that, because Mr. Cox “voluntarily opened the door for
officers,” and the officers had not expressly ordered him to do so, the officers did not facilitate
Geno’s sniff of the interior of the car. (R., pp.70 n.2, 74-75.) Accordingly, it denied Mr. Cox’s
motion. (R., p.76.)
Mr. Cox entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s
decision on his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.66, Ls.11-22; R., pp.83-85.) Thereafter, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.92-94.) Mr. Cox
filed a notice of appeal timely from that judgment. (R., pp.98-99.)

5

ISSUES
I.

Whether the officers facilitated Geno’s entry into the car, such that the dog sniff of the
interior was warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by not shutting the
car door, which had been opened in response to their knock.

II.

Alternatively, whether Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater
protections against warrantless entries into, and thus, unreasonable searches of, the
protected interiors of cars by drug dogs.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Officers Facilitated Geno’s Entry Into The Car, Such That The Dog Sniff Of The Interior
Was Warrantless Search In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment, By Not Shutting The Car
Door, Which Had Been Opened In Response To Their Knock

A.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing the decision to deny a motion to suppress, the appellate courts conduct a

bifurcated review: they defer to the factual findings of the district court which are not clearly
erroneous, but freely review the district court’s legal conclusions. State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho
163, 166 (Ct. App. 2011). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003).

B.

The District Court Made Two Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings: That Geno Did Not
“Get In The Car” And That Officer Green Did Not “Ask” For Mr. Cox To Open The
Door
Two of the district court’s factual findings are not supported by substantial and

competent evidence, and so, should be set aside. First, the district court made the factual finding
that “[a]t no point did Geno actually get into the vehicle.” (R., p.72.) That finding is clearly
erroneous because, while it is true that Geno’s paws always remained on the pavement, the facts
show he still entered (got into) the car in two respects.
Notably, the video from Officer Plaisted’s body camera shows Geno putting his nose
across the threshold of the car in order to sniff the floorboards on the driver side of the car before
verifying the alert. (Exhibit 2, ~6:08; see Tr., p.57, Ls.6-9 (the prosecutor acknowledging, “if
anything, its nose may have pierced the threshold a little bit”).) As the Idaho Supreme Court has
made clear, “[i]t was not necessary for the officer’s entire body to cross the threshold in order to
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constitute an entry under the Fourth Amendment.”3 State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 822 (2004).
Rather, any physical invasion, “‘even a fraction of an inch is too much.’” Id. (quoting Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001)). Thus, the conclusion that Geno did not “get into” the car
was not supported by substantial and competent evidence because the record actually shows he
stuck his nose into the passenger compartment. By doing so, he “entered” the car for Fourth
Amendment purposes even though his paws did not leave the ground.
Additionally, when the door of a car is standing open, the negative space between the
door and the body of the car is, in some respects, still “inside” the car. See Liechty, 152 Idaho at
169 (holding that, when an officer stood in that negative space, he had seized the car because he
was preventing it from being driven away); compare State v. Metzger, 144 Idaho 397, 401-02
(Ct. App. 2007) (holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when an officer,
“standing outside the vehicle” was able to see the VIN inscribed on the doorjamb while the car
door was opened). For example, items in the pockets on the open door are still considered to be
in the car. Officers also stand in that space during tense situations because it affords protections
similar to being in the car. Thus, the district courts finding that Geno did not “get in” the car was
also clearly erroneous because the video shows him enter the negative space between the open
door and the body of the car prior to an alert. (Exhibit 2, ~5:45.)

3

While Maland was articulating this rule in the context of an entry into the home, the legal
principle is equally applicable to cars. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding
that officers impermissibly trespassed against a car by attaching a GPS device to its exterior as it
sat in a public parking lot); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 116 (1986) (holding that, by
reaching into a car to move papers obstructing the VIN number, the officer had conducted a
search under the Fourth Amendment, though it was ultimately a reasonable search because of the
unique nature of VIN numbers and the statutes addressing them); Liechty, 152 Idaho at 169
(holding an officer seized a person by opening the car door and standing in the negative space
between that door and the body of the car).
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The second clearly erroneous factual finding the district court made was that Mr. Cox
“voluntarily opened the door for officers” because Officer Green had not asked him to open it or
leave it open. (R., p.70 n.2, 75.) That conclusion that Officer Green did not ask him to open the
door is not supported by substantial and competent evidence because the evidence shows that,
while Officer Green did not verbally ask Mr. Cox to open the door, he actually did make a
nonverbal request by knocking on the window. See State v. Zubizreta, 122 Idaho 823, 827
(Ct. App. 1992) (explaining the occupant of a car “voluntarily complied with the request to roll
down the window,” when the officer knocked on it) (emphasis added); Hadley v. Williams, 368
F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that, when officers knock at the door, “few people will
refuse to open the door to police”); cf. State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 333 (2015) (“Any
declaration, affirmation, omission, or nonverbal conduct made for the purpose of establishing
some fact, qualifies as a statement.”) (emphasis added). As such, the district court’s factual
finding – that Mr. Cox opened the door of his own violation because Officer Green did not ask
him to do so – is clearly erroneous.

C.

The Officers Facilitated Geno’s Entry Into, And Thus, Sniff Of, The Interior Of The Car
By Leaving The Door Open
Dog sniffs are allowed on the exterior of a car because such sniffs do not involve opening

the car or intruding on the privacy interests therein. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 40 (2000) (applying the rationales from United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983));
cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (holding the dog sniff in that case was not
the same as the sensory-enhancing equipment in Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, because the sniff does not
reveal anything about what is inside the container that is not already illegal). In other words, it is
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specifically because there is no intrusion into the interior of the car during a dog sniff that there
is no violation of the Fourth Amendment when the dog sniffs the exterior of the car. See id.
As a result, when the dog sniffs the interior of the car, there is a physical intrusion into
the property and an invasion of the person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-590 (1980) (holding a search occurs at the moment the officer
crosses the threshold of the home); accord United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)
(applying that same rationale to a car: “by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected
area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred”). As such, if the officer facilitates the dog’s entry
into, and sniff of, the interior of the car, that sniff constitutes an impermissible search under the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Naranjo, 159 Idaho 258, 260-61 (Ct. App. 2015) (ultimately
holding that, because the dog’s act of sticking its nose through the car’s open window was
instinctual, it was not facilitated by the officers, and so, there was no Fourth Amendment
violation in that case).
An officer does not need a nefarious intent to “facilitate” the dog sniff because to
“facilitate” simply means “to make easier.”

MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY

AND

THESAURUS, 288 (2007). Thus, an officer facilitated a search of a car by moving items to more
easily read the obscured VIN number. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 116 (1986) (explaining
the VIN is placed so it can be read from outside the car, so as to “facilitate” its usefulness in
achieving the applicable governmental interests); cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
(holding that moving items in a person’s house, even a few inches, in order to make it easier to
read the serial number on another item is still an intrusion into the person’s privacy, and thus, a
search under the Fourth Amendment). In the context of Mr. Cox’s case, then, the question is
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whether the officers facilitated the interior sniff by making it easier for the dog to enter and sniff
the interior of the car.
Several courts have concluded that the question of whether the officer facilitated the
interior sniff turns on whether the officer or the car’s occupant physically opened the door. E.g.,
United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 373-74 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Winningham, 140
F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998); see Naranjo, 159 Idaho at 260-61. However, as the Idaho
Court of Appeals has pointed out, there is no practical difference between the situation where the
officer opens the door himself and the situation where the occupant opens it at the officer’s
request because, in either case, the previously-unviewable interior is exposed to the public to the
same extent. State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 105-06 (Ct. App. 2006). Thus, the question of who
physically opened the door is “constitutionally irrelevant.” Id. at 106.
Rather, the constitutional analysis in the dog sniff context turns on whether the officers
are examining something which the owner has already intended to expose to public perception.
See Untied States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). That is important because “the person
who answers the knock and stays within the house is not voluntarily exposing himself ‘to public
view, speech, hearing, and touch as if he is standing completely outside his house.’” United
States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1388 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42 (1976)) (alterations omitted). The same is true of a person in a car – when the person
responds to the officer’s knock by opening the door or window, but stays in the car, he has not
voluntarily exposed himself or the interior of the car to public touch and examination as if he
were already standing outside the car with the door open.4 See Irwin, 143 Idaho at 105-06.

4

Given the nature of cars, the occupant does expose some parts of the interior to public view by
driving in public. State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 120 (Ct. App. 2011) (search of the car was
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Thus, the distinction in this context is more appropriately framed as “between a person
who for no reason voluntarily decides to stand in his open doorway, and a person who merely
answers a knock on his door.” Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1388 (distinguishing Santana, wherein the
person was already standing in the threshold of the house with the door open when the officers
arrived, and thus, already “in public” for purposes of hot pursuit) (emphasis added); accord
McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d
224, 228-29 (4th Cir. 1990); Goldberg v. Junion, 208 F.Supp.3d 977, 987 (S.D. Ind. 2016);
United States v. Xiong, 60 F.Supp.2d 903, 909 (E.D. Wisc. 1999). As discussed in Section I(B),
supra, Officer Green nonverbally asked Mr. Cox to open the door by knocking on it. Therefore,
regardless of who physically opened the door, Officer Green caused the interior to be exposed to
public view, and therefore, made it easier for Geno to enter and sniff the inside of the car. 5
This is not to say that Officer Green acted impermissibly by approaching and knocking
on the window of a closed car. See, e.g., Zubizreta, 122 Idaho at 827 (holding officers can
approach and knock on a car window as part of a consensual encounter). This distinction simply
accounts for the cause-and-effect relationship between an officer’s action of knocking on a
closed door and the citizen-occupant’s reaction in terms of what the citizen actually intended to
expose to public perception. In fact, even Zubizareta recognized this distinction, describing that

justified because the officer was able to see the paraphernalia in the car in plain view). That does
not, however, legitimize all intrusions into or against the car. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 n.3.
5
Likewise, the officers’ solution of waiting to see if Mr. Cox tried to close the door or ask for it
to be closed has no impact on the critical analysis under Edmond. See Irwin, 143 Idaho at
105-06. In fact, such a rule would authorize arbitrary enforcement at the officer’s discretion, as
not all officers may share their practice of honoring such requests. (See Tr., p.6, Ls.13-21 (trial
counsel asserting that such scenarios have occurred since the decision in Naranjo). The United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that rules which allow that sort of arbitrary invasion of
privacy at the officer’s unbridled discretion are impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 661 (1979).
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situation as the occupant “voluntarily compl[ying] with the request to roll down the window,” as
opposed to voluntarily opening the window on his own, independent initiative. Id. (emphasis
added).
This is the concept that Officer Plaisted’s explanation of “playing it as it lies” does not
account for. Mr. Cox had not, on his own initiative, exposed the interior of his car to the world –
he was sitting in it with the doors and windows shut. As such, to play it as it lies, the officers
would have had to run the dog around the car with the doors and windows shut. See Edmond,
531 U.S. at 40 (sniff of car’s exterior is okay because it does not reveal anything not already
exposed to public scrutiny); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 (moving an item, even a few inches, to
expose what was not already exposed, is an impermissible search).
However, under Officer Plaisted’s practice, the officers can change that result by
knocking on the car door and requesting the occupant step out of the car. (See Tr., p.46, Ls.7-10
(Officer Plaisted testifying they do not conduct dog sniffs with people in the car).) Suddenly, as
a result of those two actions by the officers (reasonable though they might be), the canine officer
now “finds” the previously-closed car lying with the door open.

As such, the better golf

metaphor in this scenario is that the officers were playing a drop – they were hitting the ball from
a similar, but easier-to-address lie. However, by switching to that easier lie, they facilitated a
better shot.
As such, by not shutting the car door when that door had only been opened in response to
their knock, the officers made it easier for Geno to enter and sniff, instinctively or not, the inside
of the car. Therefore, they facilitated the sniff of the interior of the car, which means that sniff
was a warrantless search of the car under the Fourth Amendment. That search was not justified
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by any of the well-established exceptions the warrant requirement,6 and so, that warrantless
search was unreasonable, and violated the Fourth Amendment.

II.
Alternatively, Article I, Section 17 Of The Idaho Constitution Provides Greater Protections
Against Warrantless Entries Into, And Thus, Unreasonable Searches Of, The Protected Interiors
Of Cars By Drug Dogs
A.

Standard Of Review
While Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution is similar to the Fourth Amendment

of the United States Constitution in both language and purpose, that does not mean Idaho has to
interpret it the same way its federal counterpart has been interpreted. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho
469, 471 (2001); accord State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748 (1988). State constitutions may
provide more protections than exist under the federal Constitution.

Id. (quoting State v.

Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n.6 (1985)). Questions of constitutional interpretation are questions of
law which this Court reviews freely. Leavitt v. Craven, 154 Idaho 661, 665 (2012).

6

It is the State’s burden to prove that one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). The only exception it mentioned was the
automobile exception, but that was in regard to the officer’s own search of the car, which the
State argued was justified by Geno’s alert provided; it did not argue that exception as a
justification for Geno’s initial entry. (See R., pp.45-47.) Therefore, Geno’s warrantless entry
should be presumed to be unreasonable. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390 (holding warrantless
searches are “per se unreasonable”).
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B.

Because Of The Goals Of Idaho’s Exclusionary Rule, The Idaho Constitution Should
Stand As A Bulwark Against The Flawed Analysis Used To Justify Warrantless Entries
Into Cars Under The Fourth Amendment

1.

Since the district court failed to address Mr. Cox’s argument under the Idaho
Constitution, this case should be remanded for appropriate fact finding and an
actual determination on that issue, and this Court should provide guidance for that
remand

Mr. Cox specifically argued that “Article I, Section 17 in the Idaho Constitution has
stronger safeguards against this type of intrusion. The exclusionary rule exi[s]ted long before
Mapp v. Ohio. And, additionally, State v. Thompson from 1988 noted the uniqueness of our state
in which citizens more jealously guard privacy rights.” (Tr., p.62, Ls.11-17.) The district court
did not address that argument in its order on his motion. (See generally R., pp.69-76.) As such,
this Court should vacate that order and remand this case so the district court can make any
necessary findings of fact related to that issue and render a decision on it in the first instance.
See State v. Fuller, 138 Idaho 60, 63-64 (2002) (explaining that, where the district court failed to
address the defendant’s alternative basis for suppression, “[t]hat issue will have to be resolved on
remand”).7
When remanding a case for the district court to consider an issue in the first instance, the
appellate courts will occasionally give guidance on questions of law that are likely to arise
during the remand, so as to promote judicial efficiency. E.g., State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110,
113 (2005). This should only be done in regard to issues “that have a practical effect on this
appeal,” in order to avoid issuing impermissible advisory opinions.

7

North Idaho Building

Even if this Court does not remand this case for the district court to decide this issue in the first
instance, it should still reverse the order denying the motion to suppress under the Idaho
Constitution for the reasons discussed infra, as that issue presents a question of law and was
preserved below.
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Contractors Ass’n v. City of Hayden, 164 Idaho 530, ___, 432 P.3d 976, 986 (2018) (choosing to
provide guidance because the issues to be addressed “are necessary to resolution of this case in
future proceedings”) (emphasis omitted).
The question of whether the Idaho Constitution provides greater protections than its
federal counterpart is likely to arise on remand, as evidenced by the district court’s question to
trial counsel about whether there was any case law in Idaho saying the Idaho Constitution
provides greater protections in this regard. (Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.63, L.10.) The district court also
noted the related question – whether the officer should be required to close the door when the
occupant has no realistic opportunity to close it himself – is an issue of first impression in Idaho.
(R., pp.73-74.) Since these unresolved questions of law will be the central focus of the analysis
on remand in this case, this Court should give guidance on those legal questions.

2.

The goals of Idaho’s exclusionary rule reveal the Idaho Constitution should
provide greater protections in this context, so as to protect against unjustified,
warrantless entries into cars particularly since the analysis under the federal
Constitution is fundamentally flawed

The Idaho Constitution has been found to be more protective than its federal counterpart
in several respects. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 299-300 (1988) (recognizing
heightened protections particularly in the context of seizing cars).

Notably, the Idaho

Constitution recognizes there are other reasons to suppress evidence than just to deter police
misconduct. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 992 (1992). Specifically, Idaho’s exclusionary
rule is also designed to provide an effective remedy to a person who was subjected to an
unreasonable search or seizure, to provide thoroughness in the warrant-issuing process, to avoid
the secondary constitutional violation which occurs when the courts consider evidence obtained
through illegal means, and to preserve judicial integrity. Id.
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Because of these additional goals, suppression may be proper even when the officer does
not act unreasonably. See State v. Pettit, 162 Idaho 849, 854-55 (Ct. App. 2017), rev. denied. In
Pettit, the officer made a reasonable mistake of law when he pulled over a car. Id. Despite the
reasonableness of his actions, the Court of Appeals still held the evidence found as a result of
that unlawful stop should be suppressed under Idaho’s exclusionary rule, noting that “even a
minimal intrusion upon an individual’s privacy may amount to an unreasonable government
search or seizure.” Id.
The rationales behind the decision in Pettit are also applicable here. Here, too, the
officers’ actions may have been reasonable, and so, there would be no misconduct to correct.
Nevertheless, as in Pettit, there was still an unreasonable warrantless intrusion into Mr. Cox’s
privacy because, absent the State proving the existence of such an exception, warrantless entries
are “per se unreasonable.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). As discussed in
Section I(B), Geno actually entered the car before giving a verified alert. The State did not make
any arguments in the district court about what exception would have justified that warrantless
entry into the protected interior of the car. (See generally R., pp.43-48.) As such, Geno’s entry
into the car was presumptively unreasonable. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390. Therefore, Mr. Cox, like
the defendant in Pettit, should be afforded an effective remedy for the unreasonable search of his
property despite the fact that the officers’ actions did not amount to misconduct.
The Idaho Constitution should also provide additional protections in this context in order
to protect judicial integrity. That is because the analysis used in the federal context appears to
run contrary to several fundamental legal principles. First and foremost, it turns on an evaluation
of the officer’s subjective intentions – if the officer did not intend for the dog to enter the car
(if the dog entered the car on its own instinct), then the dog’s warrantless entry will be excused.
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See, e.g., Naranjo, 159 Idaho at 260-61; United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir.
2012); United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2010); Lyons, 486 F.3d at 373-74;
see also Winningham, 140 F.3d at 1331 (refusing to excuse the warrantless entry because the
officer intended for the dog to be able to enter the van). 8 Of course, the subjective intent of the
officer is usually irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analyses. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996); see State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 652 (2017). The Idaho Supreme Court has
previously held, upon finding the analysis under the federal constitution on a particular question
was flawed, “art 1, § 17 will stand as a bulwark” against the resulting, unjustified intrusions into
daily life in Idaho and provide the proper extent of the protections which Idaho’s citizens
retained for themselves. Thompson, 114 Idaho at 751. Because the federal analysis in this
context is based on an improper consideration of the officer’s subjective intentions, the Idaho
Constitution should stand as a bulwark in this context too.
That the Idaho Constitution should serve as a bulwark against such warrantless entries is
also demonstrated by the fact that the federal analysis does not account for the documented
concern that trained animals will only appear to act instinctively, when, in fact, they are actually
reacting to subconscious (or worse, subtle) cues from their handlers.

Matthew Slaughter,

Supreme Court’s Treatment of Drug Detection Dogs Doesn’t Pass the Sniff Test, 19 New Crim.
L.Rev. 279, 299 (2016) (explaining this is known as the “Clever Hans effect,” and detailing the
research underlying the concerns it raises in trained animals); Jane Bambauer, Defending the
Dog, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1203, 1207 (2013) (warning against the possibility that further research

8

It does not appear from the opinions in those cases that the subjective nature of the analysis was
brought to the courts’ attention. See generally Naranjo, 159 Idaho 258; Sharp, 689 F.3d 616;
Lyons, 486 F.3d 367; Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328.
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could validate the initial experiments showing the Clever Hans effect exists in regard to drug
dogs, and thereby, undermine the justification for using drug dogs entirely). These concerns
needs to be accounted for because these cases do not involve a horse trained to amaze by
“solving” math problems, as Clever Hans did. See Slaughter, supra. Rather, they involve
officers using dogs to make otherwise-unjustified intrusions into a person’s constitutionallyprotected privacy in the hopes of discovering incriminating evidence that might otherwise go
undetected. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013). As such, the Idaho Constitution
should account for those concerns and protect against cued entries masquerading as instinctive
behavior.
The need for an Idaho Constitution bulwark is further highlighted by the fact that there is
no reason to risk such warrantless intrusions in the first place. Both officers admitted that they
will be able to effectively pursue the government’s legitimate interest in drug interdiction even if
they are required to close car doors before deploying drug dogs. (See Tr., p.25, Ls.2-22 (Officer
Green testifying that whether the door is opened or closed should not affect the dog’s ability to
detect an odor, if one is present); Tr., p.42, Ls.4-11 (Officer Plaisted testifying it does not matter
to him as the handler whether the door is opened or closed when he deploys his dog).) “The
constitutionality of particular law enforcement conduct ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’” State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 737-38 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). Since there is no legitimate government interest actually
served by leaving the door open, the Idaho Constitution should stand as a bulwark against the
unnecessary risk of an unintentional, but still unjustified, warrantless intrusions into the protected
interior of a car.
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Likewise, Idaho should not risk such unnecessary, warrantless entries based on whether
the occupant tries to shut the door or asks the door be closed because that would authorize
arbitrary invasions of privacy at the unbridled discretion of the officers. For example, since the
police department has not established any polices in this regard (Tr., p.41, Ls.18-21; R., pp.73-74
(the district court noting Idaho’s courts have not spoken on that issue either)), other officers,
unlike Officer Green, could choose to simply ignore an occupant’s request to shut the door.
(Tr., p.6, Ls.13-21 (defense counsel arguing that such scenarios have played out in other cases
since the decision in Naranjo); compare Tr., p.24, Ls.18-20 (Officer Green testifying that, when
he hears such requests, he honors them).) Rules which give that sort of unbridled discretion to
officers should not pass muster under the federal constitution, Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 661, and
so, it definitely should not pass muster under the Idaho Constitution. Thompson, 114 Idaho at
751.
Moreover, there may be situations where the occupant does not have a realistic
opportunity to actually close the door. The district court acknowledged such a situation may
have existed in this case. (R., p.75 (though noting Mr. Cox might have tried to close the door
with his foot); see Exhibit 1, ~4:33 (showing Mr. Cox either had his arm controlled by Officer
Green, or was ordered to keep his hands on his head as he got out of his car and was led away
from it). In such cases, whether or not to shut the door is left entirely to the officer’s discretion.
Thus, this Court should answer that question of first impression (see R., pp.73-74) in favor of
requiring officers to close the door, so as not to authorize an impermissibly arbitrary rule.
Furthermore, focusing on whether the occupant requests the officers close the door also
does not make the situation less arbitrary. For example, that practice would not account for the
situation where the officer does not hear the request to shut the door. (See Exhibit 1, ~4:33
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(showing Officer Green as focused on addressing Mr. Cox’s attempts to exercise his
constitutional right to counsel).) That practice also does not account for the situation where the
canine officer arrives partway through the encounter. In that situation, the canine officer could
being a dog sniff without knowing that the occupant had requested the door be closed, but the
primary officer had not yet been able to close it. As such, Officer Plaisted’s practice endorses a
system where officers have unbridled discretion in such circumstances. The Idaho Constitution
should stand as a bulwark against this sort of arbitrary, warrantless intrusions. Thompson, 114
Idaho at 751.
Finally, the Idaho Constitution should afford this greater protection because essentially
every case that involves a dog sniff of a car will involve the door being opened at the officer’s
request, since the officers can order the occupants to get out of a car as a matter of course.
See State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977)). In fact, Officer Plaisted testified that is what actually happens:
“we never deploy our dog to sniff the exterior of cars when there’s occupants inside the vehicle”
because it presents a safety concern. (Tr., p.46, Ls.7-10.) This means drug dogs would be able,
under Officer Plaisted’s practice, to warrantlessly enter the otherwise-protected interiors of cars
and search for evidence of drug possession without any particularized suspicion of drug use. 9
The Idaho Constitution has actually already been found to provide more protection in that
regard,10 as it prohibits stopping cars at a DUI roadblock because there is no particularized

9

Because it relied on the dog sniff, the district court did not make determination below as to
whether the officers in this case actually had reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity, much
less whether there was reasonable suspicion of drug possession, as opposed to just loitering and
driving under the influence of a stimulant. (See generally R., pp.69-76.)
10
The Henderson Court indicated the United States Supreme Court had not spoken on the issue
of DUI roadblocks. Henderson, 114 Idaho at 299. However, the Supreme Court has since held
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suspicion to justify the initial seizure. Henderson, 114 Idaho at 299-300. Those same concerns
about the lack of particularized suspicion justify greater protections under the Idaho Constitution
in terms of having officers shut the door to a car before conducting a dog sniff.
For all those reasons, the district court’s order denying suppression should be reversed
under the Idaho Constitution, since the other goals of Idaho’s exclusionary rule, such as
providing a remedy for the unreasonable warrantless entry and preserving judicial integrity,
weigh in favor of suppressing the fruits of the objectively-unreasonable warrantless entry that
actually occurred in this case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Cox respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion to suppress
under either the federal or state constitution and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

that a roadblock where all cars were stopped briefly and the same requests made of each driver
are permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427-28
(2004); see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657, 663 (suggesting such roadblocks might be
permissible). As such, the Idaho Constitution provides more protections than its federal
counterpart in that context.
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